Adams_spectacle.doc - Passions and Tempers

ADAM'S SPECTACLES Nature, Mind and Body
in the Age of Mechanism Noga Arikha A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Warburg Institute
University of London
2001
Abstract This thesis explores the ways in which the mind-body relationship was
problematized after Descartes, in the context of the scientific revolution
in the second half of the seventeenth century, both in France and in
England. It is an attempt to historicize ongoing debates within the
cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind about the problem of
consciousness. By reconstructing a history of the status of the self-aware,
human mind through the history of scientific explanation, I address the
question of whether or not a complete, scientific explanation of higher
consciousness is possible.
Adopting a conceptual, rather than chronological framework, I
concentrate on figures who played a role in the scientific, theological and
philosophical debates of their day, rather than on the subjects studied in
modern philosophy curricula, although Descartes, Locke and Malebranche are
present throughout. Part I focuses mainly on post-Cartesian views on
dualism. Part II relates these theoretical debates to discussions about the
nature of scientific enquiry. The thesis begins with Fellows of the Royal
Society, including William Holder and George Dalgarno, who discussed the
possibility of devising a language for the deaf, as well as the nature of
language, ideas and perception. Orthodox followers and later interpreters
of Descartes like Gérauld de Cordemoy, François Fenelon and Louis de La
Forge also wrote about these issues. Debates over the Cartesian 'beast-
machine' thesis and over definitions of reason and instinct, are considered
next, by looking at the works of Ignace-Gaston Pardies, Antoine Dilly and
Pierre Bayle. These discussions were a manifestation of the need to define
human nature apart from its physical embodiment. Part II begins with a
consideration of the various ways that sceptical traditions informed
programmes of scientific enquiry on both sides of the Channel, through the
writings of Joseph Glanvill and Bernard de Fontenelle, among others.
Arguments about teleology and about the relation between anatomical form
and physiological function by thinkers and natural philosophers such as
Robert Boyle, Nicolaus Steno and Thomas Willis are treated in the next
chapter. These enquiries prepare the ground for the final chapter, which
considers texts by physicians and anatomists, including Claude Perrault and
Guillaume Lamy, on the physiology of the 'corporeal soul'. CONTENTS
Acknowledgements 4
A note on the text 7 Introduction 8 I. Signs of mind and the souls of beasts 29
Presentation 30 1. Deafness, ideas and the language of thought 40
2. From other minds to animal bodies 76
3. The beast-machine controversy:
reason, instinct and the causality of motion 107
II. Teleology, science and scepticism 131 Presentation 132
1. Other worlds: the science of knowledge 140
2. Understanding function: the organs of cognition 165
in animal and man
3. From sense to soul: God, reason and human will 201
Conclusion 242 Bibliography 248
Acknowledgements
This project, like many PhD dissertations, has taken a fairly long time to
complete. It has been a privilege to be able to spend these years on
research, thinking and writing, with few cares in the world apart from the
joys and anxieties usually associated with the contemplative life. For
better or worse, this is a doctorate I can claim to have needed to write,
and I am immensely grateful to all those who have supported me in my wish
to pursue this line of enquiry, and who have believed in its potential
interest. The Warburg Institute has been a unique institutional home and a haven of
old scholarly values. The topic of the dissertation was conceived here,
where the commitment to interdisciplinarity allows for great freedom of
thought. Jill Kraye, who has guided this project at the Warburg, is bound
to be one of the most available, supportive and dedicated supervisors
anywhere. The thesis, such as it is, would not have come into existence
without her presence; nor would it have found its shape without her
editorial rigour, her intellectual discipline, her measured but constant
encouragement, and her interest in helping me find a methodology suitable
for the development of an argument more philosophical than historical. Most
importantly, she has taught me how to temper my inordinate flights into
abstraction, with a dose of the historian's sobriety here and a dose of
passion for clear thinking there. Charles Hope is another member of the
Warburg staff to have witnessed the work's progression from inception to
completion, reading chapters as they slowly poured out, with sympathy,
interest and a welcome eye for incoherences.
Outside the Warburg, David Papineau generously read the text as it
took shape, providing me at regular intervals with necessary philosophical
comments and questions on some crucial points. A meeting with Simon
Schaffer at the very beginning provided enough material for the next years;
Rivka Feldhay's interest early on was encouraging. Alexander Goldbloom
helped me on many occasions from his base at the Wellcome Institute. Talks
with Kristine Haugen have been illuminating. Thanks to Georges Rey for a
provocative conversation, to Kenan Malik for a provocative argument and to
Luca Turin for a provocative remark. I am grateful to Richard Serjeantson,
who read and annotated the chapters on animal minds with care and interest.
Daniele Derossi has taught me much on Renaissance anatomy. Many thanks to
Gloria Origgi for some especially pointed and clarifying comments she made
on a few sections of the thesis; to Pia Pera and Adam Freudenheim for
reading the introduction; and to Roberto Casati for helpful remarks early
on. I am also grateful to David Goodhart and Prospect Magazine for
providing me with a 'real world' base and to Edmund Fawcett for lengthy
lunches and a writing outlet. Daily interaction with members of the Warburg, whether staff or students,
is bound to have left much more than an academic mark on life after the
PhD. François Quiviger's friendship over the years extends far beyond the
Institute; his insights and our exchanges on topics we both have battled
with have been formative in countless ways. Surrounded by art historians, I
have not had time to miss the images absent from this thesis; but I have
learned how to begin understanding them better. Ending the day in the
photographic collection invariably revived the mind and gaze; thanks to
Paul Taylor, Mariana Giovino and Rembrandt Duits for their catching
enthusiasm. My sense of belonging to a wonderful community was due in large
measure to the affection of Liz McGrath and that of Ruth and Nicolai
Rubinstein, as well as to Nico Mann, who, as Director of the Institute,
contributed much to this sense of belonging. I thank him for giving me the
opportunity to spend these marvelous years here. Working in the bright
second-floor student room of the Warburg building, overlooking the squares
of Bloomsbury, has been a remarkably joyful experience; the company of
Annie Giletti, Marika Leino, David Porreca and Alessandro Scafi over the
last year of work has sweetened the rush to completion. Daniel Andersson's
many appearances were energizing; I thank him for comments he made on the
subject of this thesis and for bibliographical advice. Guido Rebecchini was
a supportive accomplice earlier on, as was Julie Boch, who sojourned
further along the corridor and shared her insights on Enlightenment
literary history. The process of conceiving and writing this doctorate has been marked by
numerous friendships and conditioned by timely, crucial meetings. I can
only mention a few here. It is fair to say that the seeds of the project
were sown when I first met Israel Rosenfield and Catherine Temerson some
eight years ago - before I had even decided to pursue postgraduate studies
- at the end of a formative internship at the New York Review of Books.
While there, I had already begun developing an interest in the history and
philosophy of the mind sciences; but it was fed over the following years by
many conversations with Israel, by his scepticism about our capacity to
understand minds and brains and his knowledge of the role of history in
shaping our beliefs about them.
More people than I can name here helped the thesis grow, directly or
indirectly. I am grateful to John Armstrong, G